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Abstract 
We present a synthesis of the studies that have investigated the interpretation bias of ambiguous information in children and 
adolescents with anxiety. In particular, we examine how the threat is perceived, if it is general or specific and in accordance with 
the anxiety, the probability and cost of social events, judgment on the probability of future negative events and their occurrence
to oneself vs. others and parents’ influence on the interpretation of ambiguity by their children. Finally, we review the classical 
theoretical models (i.e, the Schema Theory and Associative Network Theory) and more recent one (i.e., the theory of Williams et
al., 1988, 1997) which try to explain this bias.  
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
The interpretation bias consists of systematically assigning a threatening meaning to an objectively ambiguous 
stimulus with several possible interpretations. This bias has been widely studied in adults with anxiety (see Castillo 
2010a for a review) and depression, but to a lesser extent in children; despite research into children having improved 
a great deal over the last two decades, as shown by the reviews of Daleiden and Vasey (1997), Gotlib and MacLeod 
(1997) and  Vasey and  MacLeod (2001). 
To examine this bias in children, homophone and homograph paradigms, ambiguous vignettes and variations 
have been used -“Reduced Evidence for Danger” (RED) and “Space Odyssey”-, projected techniques and pictorial 
material. In the homophone paradigm (Hadwin, Frost, French y Richards, 1997), words with the same pronunciation 
but different graphic representation and meaning are presented; for example, die/dye, groan/grown, pain/pane. The 
procedure consists of presenting the homophone aurally and asking the subjects to write down the word they have 
heard. In this way, we obtain the interpretation they have made of the homophone.  
Homographs (Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish, 2000) are words with the same graphic 
representation but different meaning; for example, sentence can mean a phrase or punishment; revolution, a turn or 
war; stole, a scarf or robber. The task consists of reading homographic words and then making a phrase with them.  
In the studies with vignettes (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, and Ryan, 1996; Chorpita, Albano, and Barlow, 1996; 
Waters, Craske, Bergman, and Treanor, 2008), brief descriptions of ambiguous everyday situations in the lives of 
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children are presented and the subjects are asked to indicate the most probable result of these from two options – 
threatening vs. neutral. A variation of this paradigm is the one known as the “Reduced Evidence for Danger” (RED). 
In this one, the children are told that the situations will have an “unhappy” or “happy” ending, and they are asked to 
decide if the story is frightening or not. Another ingenious variation is the “Space Odyssey” (Muris, Huijdin, Mayer, 
and Hameetman, 2008). It consists of a computer program in which the child makes an imaginary trip in space to an 
unknown planet to find out about the lives of its inhabitants. Brief scenarios are described and the children have to 
choose between a negative or positive result.
In studies with projected techniques, Muris and van Doorn (2003) use images from the Thematic Apperception 
Test and the Columbus Test in a segmented form to investigate if this abnormal way of perceiving a threat occurs in 
the absence of verbal information.  
Finally, In-Albon, Klein, Rinck, Becker and Schneider (2008) have come up with a pictorial paradigm of forced 
choice in which images represent social situations and ones of separation.  
Studies involving all these paradigms are prone to an interpretative bias of threat, in which the ambiguous 
information is interpreted as threatening. There is empirical evidence that differences in information processing exist 
among children and adolescents with high and low levels of anxiety. Furthermore, this bias is analogous to that 
observed in adults (see Castillo 2010a), as well as to the attentional bias in children (Dubner and Motta, 1999) and in 
adults (see Castillo, 2003, 2004 for review). 
2. Perception of the threat.  General or specific?
It is of interest to find out how children perceive threat and the way in which they perceive it when they suffer 
from some kind of anxiety disorder. If they always perceive the threat as something negative, regardless of their 
disorder, it would be considered as having a general character. If, on the other hand, it is related to their disorder, it 
has a specific character.
Muris and cols. have carried out various studies to examine this characteristic of threat. In their first study, Muris, 
Merckelbach and Damsma (2000) presented socially ambiguous scenarios with instructions to children to indicate if 
they made them frightened or not. They also had to say how each story might end and how they might feel if they 
had to face the situation in reality. Children with social anxiety: a) presented lower thresholds for threat perception 
than the control group, b) perceived threats more often, and c) interpreted the stories as being threatening more often 
and showed higher levels of negative feelings and cognitions related to the stories than the control group. 
 In their second study, Muris, Kindt, Bögels, Merckelbach, Gadet and Moulaert (2000) replicated the results 
of previous study. With respect to general vs. specific bias, the results suggested that the abnormalities in threat 
perception were more influenced by the general level of anxiety than by a specific kind of alteration. 
 In the third study, Muris, Luerman, Merckelbach and Mayer (2000) found the same results as in the 
previous studies, except for the abnormal way in perceiving the threat that had a specific character and was not 
solely influenced by levels of general anxiety. A novel result is that the non-threatening stories were also perceived 
as threats, which suggests that when children with anxiety face this type of non-threatening situation a bias is 
produced tending to expect threatening consequences. Therefore, these results not only indicate that anxiety is 
accompanied by an abnormal perception of threat, but also that these distortions appear when facing benign 
situations.  
In summary, anxiety is associated with a high level of threat perception and low threshold for its detection. As for 
the general or specific character, the data presented are mixed, favoring the general character in some studies (e.g., 
Muris, Kindt, et al, 2000) and the specific in others (e.g., Bögels and Zigterman, 2000; Dalgleish et al., 2003; In-
Albon, Klein, Rinck, Becker and Schneider, 2008; Muris, Luerman, Merckerbach and Mayer, 2000). This specific 
nature in children coincides with that found in adults; however, before determining the specific character in children 
for sure, more evidence is required from different samples and emotional disorders, as at the moment the number of 
studies that have tackled this question are few.  
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2.1. Temporal stability in threat perception 
Few studies have examined temporal stability in threat perception of children. Muris, Jacques, and Mayer (2004) 
presented a group of children with stories containing several ambiguous phrases about which they had to determine 
different levels of threat. Four weeks later, they re-interviewed the participants. They hypothesized that on both 
occasions, anxiety would be associated with an abnormal perception of threat, and that such perception would 
remain stable for the 4 weeks. They found positive correlations between the scores for anxiety and threat frequency, 
evaluation and interpretation of threat, and a negative correlation between anxiety and threat threshold. This 
indicates that high anxiety is accompanied by a high threat perception, high evaluation, frequent threatening 
interpretation and an early detection of threat in both sessions. Data regarding temporal stability were only 
moderately correlated between test-retest ranging from 0.44 and 0.63 for the above mentioned values and a 
correlation of 0.61 for the joint score of all of them. Therefore, anxiety was quite stable on both occasions, while the 
threat bias only reached moderate stability.  
In a further study, Muris, Meesters, Smulders and Mayer (2005) used a longer time interval between sessions –8 
weeks–. They obtained a positive correlation between anxiety scores and global threat perception scores r = 0.43 
and r = 0.41 for the first and second sessions, respectively. The high levels of anxiety were associated with high 
levels of threat perception. The stability in threat perception was quite stable, correlations of test-retest being 
between 0.71 and 0.87 for the threat values mentioned.  
Clearly, stability vs. transitory in threat perception awaits greater empirical evidence, due to the small number of 
studies in this area. Furthermore, this feature is not only important in itself, but also because it is believed to underlie 
the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. 
3. Probability and cost of social events  
Rheingold, Herbert and Franklin (2003) researched the probability and cost of negative social and non-social 
events on adolescents with and without social anxiety. They also studied the effect that the gender of the participants 
could have on the evaluation of social situations. They hypothesized: a) that adolescents with social anxiety would 
evaluate social events as more likely and with a higher cost than the control group, and b) there would be no 
difference between adolescents with anxiety and the control group in the probability and cost of non-social 
situations. Their results supported the first hypothesis and only partially the second. They observed differences in 
the evaluation between the group with social anxiety and the control; however, the scores of the group with anxiety 
in the cost sub-scale for non-social events were higher than the control group’s scores. Gender did not turn out to be 
a significant factor in explaining cognitive biases, which is not in accordance with the literature on this subject (e.g., 
Craske, 1997; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, and Hameetman, 2008), as evidence supports the fact that adolescent girls 
are more prone to anxiety than boys. 
4. Judging the probability of future negative events and their occurrence to oneself versus others 
Data on the probability of an event occurrence have traditionally been interpreted in terms of “heuristic 
probability” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which suggests that the probability of an event is not generated by a 
process of logical calculation, but in fact depends on the availability that event situations or scenarios, similar to 
those stored in memories, can be brought to mind at the moment a certain response is given. 
Studies on this subject in children and adolescents are scarce, and the data do not concur with those obtained 
from adults (Butler and Mathews, 1983). Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, and Canterbury (1997) 
carried out a study with youngsters with anxiety and depression. In contrast with the results from Butler and 
Mathews (1983), youngsters with anxiety do not judge that negative events will occur with greater probability than 
the control group. Furthermore, they judged that these events would more likely occur to others than to themselves. 
This other-focus bias was stronger in the anxiety group than the control group. However, the responses from the 
group with depression showed that the event could equally as likely happen to them as to others.  
The results from Dalgleish et al. (1997) and others (e.g., Canterbury, Golden, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi and 
Yule, 2004; Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule and Canterbury, 2000) show that in anxiety there is a 
great tendency to judge the probability of negative events happening. Moreover, these are judged as self-focusing in 
adults and other-focusing in children and adolescents.
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5. Parents’ influence on the interpretation of ambiguity by their children 
It is obvious that parents have an important influence on their children due to genetic, environmental factors or a 
combination of both (see Rapee, Schniering and Hudson, 2009 for a review). Another question is to determine the 
specific influence that parents have on the interpretation of ambiguity by their children. The first authors to deal 
with this issue were Barrett, Rapee, Dadds and Ryan (1996) with three groups:  a group with different anxiety 
disorders; a group with oppositional defiant disorder and a control group. They were presented with 12 vignettes of 
ambiguous situations and were asked to interpret them and come up with a planned response. A threat interpretation 
bias was obtained from the participants with high anxiety compared to the control group. Moreover, the response 
pattern was different for each group: children with the oppositional defiant disorder gave a high number of 
aggressive responses and the anxious group a high number of avoidant responses. Data from the parents reflect those 
of the children: parents of the anxious children had a similar number of interpretations of threat as their children and 
they predicted that they would have a high number of avoidant responses. Parents of children with oppositional 
behavior had a relatively high level of threat interpretations and predicted aggressive responses in their children. 
Parents of the children in the control group had a low level of threat interpretation and predicted few responses of 
avoidance or aggression in their children. According to the authors, these results indicate that children could have 
learnt to interpret and respond to certain situations within their family contexts.  
The results of the effect of family discussion between parents and children on two ambiguous situations provided 
more data on the possible role of the family in the maintenance of children anxious and aggressive behavior. To 
study this, changes in the response of children after such discussion were investigated. In children with anxiety, 
avoidant responses increased considerably after the discussion; children with oppositional behavior also increased 
their aggressive behavior and the control group reduced the number of avoidant and aggressive responses. These 
data suggest that the family plays an important role in the child’s choice of problem-solving strategy for ambiguity 
and avoidant behavior in families with anxious children and aggressive responses in families with oppositional 
behavior are also reinforced. It seems that the family produces an increase in avoidant and aggressive responses in 
children, a phenomenon that the authors call “FEAR” (Family enhancement of avoidant and aggressive responses). 
This phenomenon has vital importance; because, if confirmed, it would shed light on the possible origin of anxiety 
in children; furthermore, it would lead to the development of appropriate preventative programs applicable to 
parents and children to minimize the adverse effects of anxiety. Several studies have tested this phenomenon (e.g., 
Chorpita, Albano, and Barlow, 1996; Logsdon-Conradsen, 1998;  Cobham, Dadds, and Spence, 1999) with mixed 
results. Studies by Barrett et al. (1996) and Chorpita et al. (1996) support the existence of the “FEAR” effect in 
families with anxiety, while studies by Logsdon-Conradsen (1998) and Cobham et al. (1999) reject it.  
 So far, results from studies on “FEAR” have been contradictory. In the studies with favorable results, the reason 
given is that the parents of anxious children, due to their own anxiety, view their children’s world according to their 
own negative schemata and interpret ambiguous situations in a negative manner which their children are exposed to 
and as a result stimulate their children’s negative interpretations of these situations (Bögels, van Dongen, and Muris, 
2003). Studies to the contrary are based on the idea that the mechanisms involved in the etiology of anxiety in 
children cannot be captured in such short discussion sessions -5 minutes- (Bögels et al., 2003) or that the families try 
to give a good impression as if they were families with “normal” children (Shortt, Barrett, Dadds, and Fox, 2001). 
This discrepancy in the results highlights the need for new data which would allow more definitive conclusions to be 
drawn on this phenomenon.  
6. Theoretical models 
The models put forward to explain interpretation bias in children are the same as those for adults. There is the 
Schema Theory (Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, and Greenberg, 1985), the Associative Network Theory (Bower, 1981) 
and the Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988, 1997) theory. 
6.1. Schema Theory (Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery, and Greenberg, 1985) 
This theory is based on the idea of a “schema”, meaning a functional structure of representations, which are 
relatively long-lasting, of knowledge and acquired experience. Schemata influence attention, perception, 
interpretation and memory of new information which are consistent with the content of the schema. The basic 
hypothesis is that individual differences in the process of information selection are a reflection of different schemata 
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that are activated in the cognitive system. The theory suggests that each emotion is characterized by a specific 
cognitive profile, which corresponds to the idiosyncratic content of schemata stored in the memory -Hypothesis of 
specific content -. People with anxiety have “danger schemata” which induce them to process information about 
their surroundings as a source of threat (physical or psychological). Numerous studies have provided evidence in 
favor of attention, interpretation and only weakly of memory biases (see Castillo, 2003, 2004, 2010 a, b for review). 
Therefore, there is coherence between the type of schema hypothesized in people with anxiety and the information 
they are processing as a priority. 
6.2. Associative Network Theory (Bower, 1981) 
According to this theory human memory consists of a network of associative concepts and semantic schemata in 
which the basic processing unit is the proposition, and the process the activation. In our memory, situations and the 
world in general are represented in an abstract way through a collection of simple units or propositions that describe 
them. Concepts are represented as nodes in the network at different hierarchical levels, when a certain node is 
activated, the process of activation generalizes from one concept to another or from one proposition to another, 
following the associative links between them.  
Emotions are represented in our memory as emotional units or nodes within the semantic network, in a similar 
way to conceptual nodes: a specific unit for each emotion. With respect to cognitive biases, this theory suggests that 
biases are produced in processing information in all cognitive processes and independently of the emotion being 
dealt with. Evidence does not confirm this generalized occurrence in relation to the processes or for emotions.  
6.3. Williams, Watts, Macleod, and Mathews’ Theory (1988, 1997)
With regard to cognitive biases, this theory predicts: a) Selective attention bias of information of threat in anxiety 
and an absence of such bias in depression (the two most studied emotions). It does not predict generalized memory 
biases in either of the two emotions. Instead, anxiety will produce implicit memory biases, but not explicit memory 
ones. The opposite occurs with depression: a greater association with explicit memory bias than with an implicit 
memory one; and b) an interaction effect between anxiety trait and state, and the different effects of each factor.
The reviews of Eysenck (1992) and Williams et al. (1997) have confirmed the existence of different biases for 
anxiety and depression: anxiety is associated with an attentional bias and the lack of memory bias, and depression is 
associated with a memory bias and a lack of attentional bias. With respect to interpretation bias, studies in adults 
(Castillo, 2010a for review) and with children (see present work) confirm its occurrence. In the case of adults, it has 
been confirmed that this bias is not produced immediately, but delayed, and in which strategic and elaborative 
processes are implied. Furthermore, an increase in the level of anxiety facilitates its occurrence. The study by Calvo 
and Castillo (1997) about predictive inferences and experimental conditions of stress evaluation generated more 
predictive inferences of threat than positive or neutral ones. In contrast, people with low anxiety showed an 
inhibition of these inferences. 
As for memory bias in anxiety, current evidence is contradictory (see Blaney, 1986; Williams et al., 1997; Coles 
and Heimberg, 2003; Mitte, 2008 for reviews). 
As for the interaction between anxious trait and state, studies on attentional bias (e.g., Broadbent and Broadbent, 
1988; Mogg, Bradley and Hallowell, 1994) are in favor of this interaction. Under stressful conditions that provoke 
anxiety, people with high levels of anxiety show an increase in attention towards threatening stimuli (vigilance bias), 
compared with non-stressful situations. On the other hand, people with lower anxiety showed signs of avoiding such 
threatening information (avoidant bias). The same results have been obtained for interpretation bias (Calvo and 
Castillo, 1997). 
7. Conclusions 
Interpretation bias in children and adolescents has been confirmed with different experimental paradigms. Studies 
support its existence as a genuine bias, according to which children and adolescents tend to interpret ambiguous 
stimuli as threatening. Other characteristics of anxiety in this stage of life is that the threat is more highly perceived 
and with a lower detection threshold. Data on the generality or specificity of threats are still not definitive, as studies 
that have examined this aspect have shown mixed results, confirming generality in some and specificity in others. 
1110  Mª Dolores Castillo and Pedro González Leandro / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 5 (2010) 1105–1111
As for the probability and social cost of events, evidence has been found that adolescents overestimate the severity 
and probability of negative social events happening and they assess social and non-social events in a negative way 
and with greater impact. One interesting aspect concerns the judgment children make of the probability of future 
negative events and their occurrence to themselves or others. Data show that whereas the bias in adulthood is self-
focusing, in children and adolescents it is other-focusing. With respect to the influence of parents on the 
interpretation of ambiguity of their children, results indicate that parents have an important influence -“FEAR” 
phenomenon- nevertheless more studies are required to confirm this phenomenon. Lastly, both classical theories of 
emotion (Schema and Associative Network Theories) and the Williams et al. Cognitive Theory predict biases in the 
different cognitive processes associated with anxiety. The evidence is in favor of attention and interpretation biases 
and more contradictory regarding memory bias. 
      It is worth noting that the interpretation bias in children and adolescents has only recently been studied in 
profusion, the majority of the characteristics dealt with here are awaiting greater experimental support. It is 
recommended that future studies provide new data that will allow more definitive conclusions. 
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